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We develop a simple model of managing a system subject to pollution damage under risk of 
an abrupt and random jump in the damage coefficient. The model allows the full dynamic 
characterization of the optimal emission policies under uncertainty. The results, that imply 
prudent behavior due to uncertainty, are compared with the ambiguous outcomes reported in 
the literature for similar models. The differences are explained in terms of the properties of 
the damage function associated  with each model. The framework is used to analyze the 
adaptation  vs. mitigation dilemma and provides a simple criterion to determine  whether 
adaptation activities should be undertaken promptly, delayed to some future date, or avoided 
altogether. 
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It has become clear over the last decades that many systems subject to
pollution problems may suﬀer from abrupt and unexpected changes in their
characteristics. At some threshold or tipping point, the underlying system
dynamics may shift, directing the system into another domain of attraction
with a substantial change in the services it provides. An example of such a
regime shift is abrupt climate change where accelerated feedback mechanisms
(such as ice melting) may trigger a transition to another climate regime as
soon as a threshold greenhouse-gas concentration is crossed. This transition,
once occurred, is believed to inﬂict substantial costs upon mankind. Other
examples are the eutrophication of lakes which support the livelihood of the
population along their shores and the destruction of coral-reef systems.
Many dynamic pollution control models assume smooth convex damage
functions (e.g. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992; Dockner and Long, 1993)
and ignore the eﬀect of a possible regime shift on the optimal emission policy.
Accounting for possible shifts, diﬀerent types of uncertainty may play a role.
For example, the shift can be triggered when some a-priori unknown threshold
is crossed (as in Tsur and Zemel, 1996; Nævdal, 2006). Alternatively, it
may be due to a random occurrence controlled by some given hazard rate
(Clarke and Reed, 1994; Tsur and Zemel, 1998; Gjerde et al., 1999; Haurie
and Moresino, 2006). The models diﬀer also in the speciﬁcation of the post-
occurrence outcome. Some papers focus on the system dynamics itself and
model a regime shift as a sudden change in a parameter governing it; see
Brozovi´ c and Schlenker (2011) for ecosystem control and Polasky et al. (2011)
for a ﬁshery. Alternatively, one can specify the damage incurred by the shift.
Obviously, this variety of modeling approaches gives rise to a wide range
of policy responses to uncertainty, ranging from enhanced prudence, (i.e. less
pollution) through ambiguous behavior (with the nature of the response de-
pending on the system parameters) all the way to solutions implying enhanced
pollution due to uncertainty. In this paper we present a model which is sim-
ple enough to allow a full dynamic characterization of the optimal processes
and yet is able to obtain the full range of dynamic responses as special cases.
Thus, we can trace the tradeoﬀs underlying the optimal response and explain
the large diﬀerences among the outcomes of the models cited above in a clear
and transparent manner. In order to achieve this goal, we construct the sim-
plest model that displays these tradeoﬀs. We assume that the damage follows
a quadratic law as a function of the pollution stock, with a coeﬃcient that
jumps to a larger value once the regime shift occurs. This is a gross simpli-
ﬁcation for systems that undergo a change in the underlying dynamics. For
complex problems such as climate change, however, this approach can provide
some useful insights, because the system dynamics is too complicated to be
2modeled precisely, but we may still have an idea about the damage induced
by the catastrophic shift.
We begin with the benchmark case of a regime shift whose time of occur-
rence can be predicted in advance for every emission policy, and derive the
condition under which it is optimal to trigger the shift in spite of the prior
knowledge. We ﬁnd that regardless of whether the shift is triggered or not, it
is always optimal to lower emissions from the outset since the value decreases
at the time of shift. In optimal control terminology, this is caused by a change
in the transversality condition at this time. Then, we incorporate uncertainty
by modeling the regime shift as a random event whose occurrence probability
is speciﬁed via a given hazard rate. This formulation allows to convert the
problem into a deterministic optimal control problem that can be treated us-
ing standard techniques (Kamien and Schwartz, 1971). The case of a hazard
rate that depends on the pollution stock reﬂects endogenous uncertainty where
our actions aﬀect the shift probability. It seems reasonable that higher phos-
phorus loads promote lake eutrophication while lower ﬁsh stocks increase the
probability of coral-reef collapse. One would expect that increasing hazard
implies precaution (lower emissions) from the outset. This is indeed what we
ﬁnd here, but it is not the general conclusion in the literature. For exam-
ple, several studies (Clarke and Reed, 1994; Tsur and Zemel, 1998; Aronsson
et al., 1998; Gjerde et al., 1999; Polasky et al., 2011) consider “doomsday”
regime shifts associated with a total loss of value. In this case the hazard
rate is eﬀectively added to the discount rate, increasing impatience and imply-
ing enhanced emissions (for a constant hazard rate) and ambiguous behavior
(for increasing hazard rates). Incorporating the “doomsday” events into our
framework, we reproduce these results and explain the diﬀerence in terms of
the properties of the damage function associated with each speciﬁcation.
While the result of uncertainty-induced precaution is intuitively appeal-
ing, the magnitude of the eﬀect might appear surprising at ﬁrst sight. For
example, we show that if the hazard rate depends strongly on the pollution
stock, precaution implies emissions at a rate that is even lower than in the
case the system is already at the high-damage regime! Emission reduction, in
this case, is aimed not only at reducing the direct pollution costs but also at
decreasing the probability that the shift will occur at some future time.
Considerations regarding the appropriate degree of precaution become par-
ticularly relevant in the context of the climate debate, where diﬀerent positions
are taken on the optimal emission policy. Thus, the Stern Review (Stern, 2006)
advocates intensive and early mitigation whereas Nordhaus (2008) advocates
a more gradual policy. The diﬀerent recommendations are mainly driven by
diﬀerent assumptions on the relevant discount rate, but as Weitzman (2009)
has argued, “fat-tailed” probability distributions, which assign large probabil-
ities to catastrophic impacts, dominate all other elements of the cost-beneﬁt
3analysis. This leads to the so-called “dismal theorem”, a sort of generalized
precautionary principle. This principle has been part of the Rio Declaration
in 1992, stating that “where there are threats of serious or irreversible dam-
age, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-eﬀective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. Gollier and
Treich (2003) provide an economic justiﬁcation to the precautionary principle
by developing the conditions under which the trade-oﬀs between learning ﬁrst
and acting ﬁrst lead to precaution. However, it is hard to apply these condi-
tions to random regime shifts. Our simple model, although abstracting from
numerous important details, provides simple intuitive arguments to support
precaution.
The model can also be used to shed light on the adaptation vs. mitigation
dilemma. It is now recognized that mitigating global pollution problems (such
as climate change) requires international cooperation which is hard to achieve
and sustain. Suspecting that mitigation policies may not suﬃce to prevent
the shift, an economy can invest resources in means and methods to moderate
the damage associated with the shift (e.g. Kane and Shogren, 2000; Smit et
al, 2000; Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010). For example, a ﬂat coastal country such
as the Netherlands might judge that global eﬀorts to reduce CO2 emissions
are not intense enough to avoid a sea-level rise and the catastrophic ﬂoods it
entails. A possible response can take the form of investments in the protective
dike system as well as in improved pumping capacities and inland transfer of
essential infrastructure in order to decrease the damage from future ﬂoods,
should they occur in spite of the eﬀorts to mitigate the risk. When the regime
shift time can be predicted in advance, it is relatively simple to evaluate the
beneﬁts of adaptation measures and compare them with their cost. However,
when this time is subject to uncertainty, interesting tradeoﬀs arise. First,
we have the usual considerations of investment under uncertainty, namely
the tradeoﬀ between the advantage of early investment and the value of the
option to wait. Second, investment resources must be allocated between
adaptation and mitigation. Indeed, these two kinds of tradeoﬀs interact,
and the adaptation option aﬀects the optimal mitigation policy (Kane and
Shogren, 2000).
The regime shift model presented above allows to study these considera-
tions in a simple and tractable manner. Consistent with our modeling ap-
proach, we consider the simplest possible form of adaptation that displays
these tradeoﬀs within a dynamic model. In our pollution control framework,
adaptation is seen as an investment in lowering the coeﬃcient of the high-
damage regime. This investment can be usefully carried out only prior to the
shift. We ﬁnd a rich variety of dynamic behavior, starting from the case where
prompt adaptation is optimal, via cases in which adaptation is worthwhile but
should be delayed, to the extreme case where adaptation is too costly to be
4implemented. We establish the complex interaction between the two policy
measures: the adaptation option increases emissions (and reduces mitigation)
even before this option is actually realized. At the same time, the mitigation
policy enters the condition for the cost-eﬀectiveness of adaptation. Thus, the
optimal response must consider these two measures simultaneously.
The following section presents the pollution control problem under a
regime shift threat. Section 3 characterizes the full dynamics of the post-
event solution which enters the formulation of the uncertainty problem. Sec-
tion 4 considers the “certainty” case, where the threshold is a-priori known.
In section 5 we solve the problem under uncertainty and section 6 explains
the diﬀerence between the outcomes of the regime shift and the “doomsday”
events. Section 7 introduces the adaptation option and investigates the inter-
action between mitigation and adaptation. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The regime-shift problem
Economic activities involving emissions at the rate E give rise to the in-
stantaneous concave beneﬁt E E2=2 (where  > 0 is the maximal marginal
beneﬁt) and at the same time increase the pollution stock P according to
˙ P = E   P (2.1)
where  > 0 denotes the natural decay rate. The pollution stock implies
a stream of damages at the rate P 2=2 where  is the damage coeﬃcient
which can take one of two values 2 > 1 > 0. During the initial, “clean”
period, the regime of low damage, with  = 1, holds. However, at some
point the system might shift abruptly and irreversibly to the “dirty” regime,
governed by the high damage ﬂow with  = 2. This shift may occur at some
known or estimated level of the pollution stock but it may also be subject
to uncertainty. In that case we model the transition time T to be random,







. We refer to the shift in regimes as the (random)
“event”.
Given the occurrence time T, the damage stream is governed by 1 for






where v2() is the post-event value function corresponding to the “dirty” regime,
PT is the pollution stock at the regime shift time, and  > 0 is the discount
rate. Taking the expectation with respect to the occurrence time T, we obtain










subject to (2.1) and P(0) = 0. To specify vuc completely, we must derive the










subject to (2.1) and P(0) = P0.1 We turn now to characterize the solution of
this problem.
3 The post-event problem
3.1 Steady state
The optimal emission rate corresponding to (2.3) is bounded, hence the
optimal pollution process is bounded as well. Since the problem is deﬁned in
terms of one state variable, the evolution of the state process is monotonic in
time and the process must converge to a steady state. By considering small
deviations in time and level of the steady-state policy, Tsur and Zemel (2001)
show that the optimal steady state can be characterized as a root of what they
call “the evolution function” (this can be compared to the ﬁrst-order condition
in the dynamic programming approach). This method leads to the following.
The steady-state policy corresponding to any state P is E(P) = P and
the corresponding steady-state value is
W(P) = [P   (
2 + 2)P
2=2]=: (3.1)
The evolution function becomes
L(P) = W
′(P) + (   P) = ( + )   (
2 + 2 + )P: (3.2)
This function is linear in P and hence has a unique positive root
ˆ P =
( + )
2 + ( + )
(3.3)




2 + ( + )
 (3.4)
1For notational convenience we have reset the time origin in the formulation of (2.3) so
that the event occurrence time corresponds to t = 0.
2The corner state P = 0 can be ruled out as an optimal steady state because L(0) =
( + ) > 0.
6is smaller than the rate E =  that maximizes the instantaneous beneﬁt
E   E2=2 due to the presence of the damage term 2 in the denominator of
(3.4).
3.2 Dynamic behavior
We characterize now the dynamic process that leads to the steady state ˆ P
of (3.3). The current-value Hamiltonian corresponding to (2.3) is
H = E   E
2=2   2P
2=2 + (E   P): (3.5)
Maximizing H with respect to E gives
E =  + ; (3.6)
while
˙  = ( + ) + 2P: (3.7)
Taking the time derivative of (2.1) and using (3.6) and (3.7) to eliminate ˙ 
and  we ﬁnd
¨ P    ˙ P   [2 + ( + )]P + ( + ) = 0: (3.8)




2 + ( + )
in agreement with (3.3).
To obtain the general solution of (3.8) we add the solution of the homoge-
neous equation to the inhomogeneous solution ˆ P





where r+;− are the roots of the characteristic equation
r
2   r   [2 + ( + )] = 0: (3.10)





The integration constant p− can be determined using the initial condition
P(0) = P0 or P0 = ˆ P + p+ + p−. Thus,






E(t) = P(t) + ˙ P(t) = (3.13)








The determination of the second integration constant p+ depends on the
appropriate ﬁnal time or transversality condition. In the following section
we will consider the case of a threshold that is reached in some ﬁnite time
but ﬁrst our interest is focused on the post-event problem which extends over
an inﬁnite time horizon. In this case, the exponential term corresponding
to the positive root r+ must be discarded, because it yields an unbounded
emission rate in the long term. Thus, p+ = 0 and we can omit for brevity the
superscript “ ” and write
P(t) = ˆ P + (P0   ˆ P)exp(rt); (3.14)
where
r = [  
√
( + 2)2 + 42 ]=2: (3.15)
We can now write the shadow price (t) as a linear function of the corre-
sponding pollution stock P(t)
(t) = E(t)    = P(t) + ˙ P(t)    = P(t)(r + ) + ˆ Λ; (3.16)
where the constant ˆ Λ is deﬁned, using (3.11), as




Since r +  < 0, it follows that ˆ Λ < 0.
The linear relation (3.16) also holds at the time when the regime shift
occurs. Since the derivative of the value function is equal to the shadow price,
we have established that the post-event value function v2() is quadratic in the
pollution stock with negative coeﬃcients ((r + )=2 and ˆ Λ) for the quadratic
and linear terms, respectively. The constant term (which measures the value
at the clean state P = 0) is determined by the condition v2( ˆ P) = W( ˆ P) where
W() is the steady state value given by (3.1). This yields (r ˆ P)2=(2) for the












3Strictly speaking, the result does not hold for very large P0 because the constraint E  0
is violated by our solution in this case. It is veriﬁed that the solution (3.14) is feasible so
long as P0 < ˆ Pjrj=jr + j and the bound exceeds ˆ P. In the following we assume that the
relevant pollution process never exceeds the bound so the quadratic solution for v2() can
be used in the analysis of the pre-event problem.
8Observe that the same characterization is obtained for the risk-free prob-
lem, where the regime shift can never occur. The latter problem is identical
to the post-event problem, with 1 replacing 2 as the relevant damage coef-
ﬁcient for the “clean” regime. To distinguish between the solutions of these
two problems, we denote variables corresponding to the “non-event” problem
(with  = 1) by the subscript “ne”.
4 Certainty: a known transition state
Consider now the pre-event problem. We begin with the case in which it
is known with certainty that the regime shift occurs as soon as the pollution










subject to (2.1), P(0) = 0, P(t)  ¯ P for t < T and P(T) = ¯ P, where the
transition time T is a free control variable that can take the value T = 1 if
the regime shift never occurs. Obviously, the case ¯ P > ˆ Pne is not interesting,
because the pollution process will follow Pne(t) all the way approaching ˆ Pne
and the threshold pollution state will never be reached. However, in case
¯ P < ˆ Pne we can ask whether a regime shift will be avoided or will occur at
some ﬁnite time.
Suppose that the pollution state equals ¯ P at some time and the pol-
icy maker must decide whether to increase pollution further, enjoying the
post-event value v2( ¯ P), or to stay at the present level indeﬁnitely, with the
corresponding steady-state value Wne( ¯ P). Introducing the damage function
 (P) = v2(P)   Wne(P); (4.2)
we see that avoiding the event is optimal only if  ( ¯ P)  0. Using (3.18) for
v2 and (3.1) with  = 1 for Wne we can write   explicitly as
 (P) = [(r
2 + 1   2)P
2   2r
2 ˆ PP + r
2 ˆ P
2]=(2): (4.3)
Now,  (0) = (r ˆ P)2=(2) > 0. However, at the steady state ˆ P of the
post-event problem  ( ˆ P) = (1   2) ˆ P 2=(2) < 0. It follows that  () must
vanish at some state 0 < ˜ P < ˆ P, given by the solution of






The solution ˜ P depends on the parameter f 
p
2   1=jrj and is given by
˜ P = ˆ P=(1 + f): (4.4)
9(The second solution ˆ P=(1   f) is either negative or in excess of ˆ P and can
be discarded.) The regime shift depends on the location of the threshold
pollution state ¯ P vis-` a-vis the indiﬀerence state ˜ P: no regime shift if ¯ P  ˜ P
and shifting the regime at some ﬁnite time otherwise. This result is in contrast
with the conclusions of Tsur and Zemel (2004) in which crossing the threshold
state under certainty is never optimal. The diﬀerence can be traced to the
features of the post-event value under the regime shift considered here, which
allows for positive values of the damage function at low pollution levels.
Observe that regardless of whether the regime shift occurs or not, the mere
presence of the threshold state ¯ P < ˆ Pne aﬀects the optimal emission policy. To
see this, note that although the process begins under the low damage coeﬃcient
1, it cannot follow the process Pne(t) all the time because the latter proceeds
to ˆ Pne, crossing the threshold state, which would trigger the shift. A steady
state below ¯ P cannot be optimal under 1, hence the process must reach ¯ P in
a ﬁnite time T. We must relax the condition in Section 3.2 that the coeﬃcient
p+ of (3.12) vanishes and replace it with the transversality condition associated
with the free value of T
V (T) = H( ¯ P;E(T);(T));
where V (T) = maxfv2( ¯ P);Wne( ¯ P)g, i.e. V (T) = v2( ¯ P) if ¯ P < ˜ P implies a
regime shift at time T and V (T) = Wne( ¯ P) if the system is kept at the steady
state ¯ P in order to avoid the shift. Using the dynamic characterization above,
the transversality condition speciﬁes to
2V (T) = (E(T)    ¯ P)
2   
2 ¯ P
2 + 2 ¯ P   1 ¯ P
2; (4.5)
which determines the emission rate E(T) in terms of the given values of V (T)
and P(T) = ¯ P. Note that if V (T) were equal to the non-event value vne( ¯ P),
the condition could be satisﬁed with p+ = 0. However, V (T) is in fact smaller,
so the term (E(T)    ¯ P)2 must be reduced. Writing (3.12) as4
(P0   ˆ Pne)exp(r
−
1 T) = ¯ P   ˆ Pne   p
+[exp(r
+
1 T)   exp(r
−
1 T)];
we ﬁnd, using (3.13)
E(T)    ¯ P =  r
−








The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is positive, so we must have p+ < 0
in order to decrease the value of (E(T)    ¯ P)2 and satisfy condition (4.5).
Inspecting (3.13) we establish that the emission rate E(t) must be smaller
than its non-event counterpart at all 0  t  T. The possibility of crossing
the threshold implies a more prudent emission policy at all times, both if the
crossing is avoided as well as if the damage implied by shifting regimes is
insuﬃcient to prevent the crossing.
4The roots r
+;−
1 correspond here to the damage coeﬃcient 1.
105 Uncertainty
Having derived the functional form of the post-event value function v2(),
we can also characterize the solution of the pre-event problem vuc of (2.2)
under uncertainty. In fact, modeling the threat of a regime shift with the
hazard rate h allows us to formulate the problem as a standard optimal-control
problem that can also be tackled with the evolution function method. We
compare the steady state of (2.2) with the steady state corresponding to the
risk-free (non-event) problem where the regime shift can never occur. Under
the steady-state policy, P and h(P) are ﬁxed. The survival probability at time
t becomes S(t) = exp( h(P)t) and the steady-state value for the uncertainty
problem is given by
Wuc(P) = [P   (
2 + 1)P
2=2 + h(P)v2(P)]=[ + h(P)]: (5.1)
5.1 Constant hazard
We begin with the simple case in which the hazard rate h is constant, hence
the distribution of the occurrence time is exponential, independent of the emis-
sion policy. The survival probability at time t becomes S(t) = exp( ht). We
denote variables and parameters associated with this case of constant hazard
by the subscript “ch”. Using v′
2(P) = (P), the evolution function for this
problem becomes
Lch(P) = ( + h)W
′
ch(P) + ( + h)(   P) = (5.2)
= ( + )   (
2 + 1 + )P + h[   P + v
′
2(P)] =
= Lne(P) + h[   P + (P)];
where Wch is the value Wuc of (5.1) with h(P)  h, Lne is the evolution
function for the non-event problem (with  = 1), and (P) is the shadow
price associated with the post-event problem (with  = 2). Using (3.11),
(3.16) and (3.17), we can write
   P + (P) =  + rP + ˆ Λ = r(P   ˆ P);
so that we can simplify the second term of the right-hand side of (5.2). It
follows that Lch() is also linear in P:
Lch(P) = Lne(P) + hr(P   ˆ P); (5.3)
where ˆ P is the root of the post-event evolution function. Evaluated at the root
ˆ Pne of Lne(), the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (5.3) vanishes, yielding
Lch( ˆ Pne) = hr( ˆ Pne   ˆ P) < 0
11because ˆ Pne > ˆ P (recall that 1 < 2) and r < 0. It follows that the root
ˆ Pch falls short of ˆ Pne, which means that uncertainty implies a more conser-
vative policy (less pollution) than in case the regime shift can never take
place. On the other hand, ˆ Pne > ˆ P also implies that Lne( ˆ P) > 0 hence
Lch( ˆ P) = Lne( ˆ P) > 0 and ˆ Pch > ˆ P, so that
ˆ P < ˆ Pch < ˆ Pne: (5.4)
The extra prudence implied by uncertainty is insuﬃcient to bring the steady
state pollution stock down to the level ˆ P implied by the high damage coeﬃcient
2. It can be veriﬁed that
lim
h→∞
ˆ Pch = ˆ P;
because a very high hazard rate implies an immediate shift to the “dirty”
regime.
The eﬀect of uncertainty is manifest during the full evolution of the dy-
namic process on its path to the steady state. Following the same steps as in
Section 3.2 we ﬁnd that the equation governing the optimal process Pch() is
analogous to (3.8):
¨ Pch   ( + h) ˙ Pch   [r1(r1   )   hr2]Pch   r2( + h   r2) ˆ P = 0; (5.5)
(here r1 and r2 are the negative roots of (3.10) corresponding to 1 and 2,
respectively.) The general solution (initiated at Pch(0) = 0) is












ch = [ + h 
√
( + h   2r1)2 + 4h(r1   r2) ]=2 (5.7)
and
ˆ Pch =
 + h   r2
(r1=r2)(   r1) + h
ˆ P; (5.8)
which is the inhomogeneous solution and the root of Lch. To approach
this state in the long run, the integration constant p
+
ch must vanish, yielding
Pch(t) = ˆ Pch[1   exp(r
−
cht)]. Using (5.7), it can be veriﬁed that 0 > r1 > r
−
ch,
because h > 0, and that r
−
ch > r2, because 2 > 1. It follows that (5.4) can
be extended to arbitrary times so that
P(t) < Pch(t) < Pne(t) (5.9)
for all t > 0. (P() represents here the optimal process under 2.)
125.2 Variable hazard
Next we generalize the results of the previous subsection by allowing for a
dependence of the hazard rate on the pollution stock h = h(P), with h′(P) > 0.
When choosing an emission policy, the policy maker must also account for the
eﬀect of pollution on the occurrence hazard. This introduces an additional
h′() term to the corresponding evolution function:
Luc(P) = [ + h(P)]W
′
uc(P) + [ + h(P)](   P) = (5.10)
= Lne(P) + h(P)r[P   ˆ P] + h
′(P)[v2(P)   Wuc(P)]
= ˜ Lch(P) + h
′(P)[v2(P)   Wuc(P)]:
(The “˜ ” symbol over Lch indicates a slight abuse of notation, since ˜ Lch is
deﬁned using a variable hazard rate.) Let ˆ Pch denote the root of ˜ Lch(), i.e.
the optimal steady state of the uncertainty problem under the xed hazard
h  h( ˆ Pch). For this ﬁxed-hazard problem the steady-state policy E = P is
optimal at ˆ Pch and therefore the steady-state value ˜ Wch( ˆ Pch) is certainly larger
than the value v2( ˆ Pch) which is obtained if the regime shift occurs immediately.
Since ˜ Wch( ˆ Pch) = Wuc( ˆ Pch), the last term of (5.10) is negative at this state, so
that Luc( ˆ Pch) < 0. It follows that
ˆ Puc < ˆ Pch;
where the root ˆ Puc of Luc() is the optimal steady state of the uncertainty
problem with variable hazard. We see, therefore, that the state-dependence
of the hazard rate implies extra prudence relative to the emission behavior
under ﬁxed hazard. The desire to reduce the risk pushes the pollution process
towards cleaner states.
Observe that  (P)  v2(P) Wuc(P) measures the damage incurred when
the regime shift occurs at the state P, reducing the value from the uncertainty
value Wuc(P) to the post-event value v2(P) and h(P) (P) measures the ex-
pected damage. Thus, the last term of (5.10) is a measure of the change in
expected damage due to the hazard variation. Indeed, when the marginal
hazard is large, this term can give rise to a surprising result.
Note that  (P) can also be written in the form  (P) = [v2(P) Wne(P)]=[+
h(P)] (which agrees with (4.2) when h  0). Now ˆ P is the steady state of
the post-event problem. It follows that v2( ˆ P) = W( ˆ P) and thus  ( ˆ P) =
(1   2) ˆ P 2=2[ + h( ˆ P)]. On the other hand, Lne( ˆ P) = L( ˆ P) + (2   1) ˆ P =
(2   1) ˆ P, reducing (5.10) to
Luc( ˆ P) = Lne( ˆ P) + h
′( ˆ P) ( ˆ P) = (2   1) ˆ P
(
1  
h′( ˆ P) ˆ P
2[ + h( ˆ P)]
)
:
If h′( ˆ P) > 2[ + h( ˆ P)]= ˆ P, it follows that Luc( ˆ P) < 0 and thus
ˆ Puc < ˆ P:
13If the marginal dependence of the hazard rate on the pollution stock is suf-
ﬁciently high, the eﬀect on precaution is such that pollution is even further
reduced than in the case of an immediate shift to the dirty regime! (cf. 5.4)
6 Catastrophic damage
In our model a catastrophic event corresponds to an exceedingly large
damage, which is obtained when the post-event damage coeﬃcient 2 tends to
inﬁnity. In contrast, earlier models of such events (Clarke and Reed, 1994;
Tsur and Zemel, 1998; Aronsson et al., 1998; Gjerde et al., 1999; Polasky et
al., 2011) refer to a “doomsday event” in which the catastrophic occurrence
abruptly ceases all economic activities, giving rise to the post-event value
v2  0. The latter speciﬁcation oﬀers the obvious advantage of simplicity,
because in this case the hazard eﬀect is equivalent to increasing the discount
rate from  to  + h(P).5
The distinction among the two speciﬁcations might appear insigniﬁcant,
since both seem to describe highly undesirable occurrences which should be
avoided as far as it is possible. However, they entail very diﬀerent pre-event
behavior. In our model, the threat of a catastrophic occurrence implies ultra-
cautious behavior that would bring the long-term pollution level down to the
clean state P = 0. In contrast to this intuitive behavior, the “doomsday
event” gives rise to ambiguous results, and in the simple case of a constant
positive hazard it actually calls for more pollution relative to the case in which
occurrence is not possible. In order to explain this diﬀerence, we turn to look
at each case in more detail.
6.1 Catastrophic regime shift
In the limit 2 ! 1, we ﬁnd from (3.3) that ˆ P ! 0. The extremely
high pollution damage calls for pollution reduction and directs the post-event
policy towards the clean state. In the same limit, (3.15) implies that the
negative root r !  1. Under a constant hazard, the second term of the
right-hand side of (5.3) will drive Lch(P) to large negative values for all states
P exceeding ˆ P. It follows that the steady state ˆ Pch also tends to zero in this
limit. Finally, we recall that a pollution dependent hazard calls for enhanced
prudence relative to the case of a constant hazard and hence the pre-event
policy will tend to the clean state also in this case. We see the damage eﬀect
at work here: a very high damage implies extreme precaution and diminishing
pollution.
5For the economic implications of endogenizing the eﬀective discount rate via a pollution-
dependent hazard in another environmental context, see Tsur and Zemel (2009).
146.2 \Doomsday" event
With v2  0, we see from (5.2) that under constant hazard the uncertainty
evolution function takes the form
L
dd
ch(P) = Lne(P) + h(   P):
Evaluated at the steady state ˆ Pne of the non-event problem, this gives
L
dd




1 + ( + )
)
> 0;
so that the steady state of this uncertainty problem lies above ˆ Pne. We see
that the constant hazard actually implies more pollution than the outcome
of the problem without occurrence risk. This result is explained in terms of
discounting at the increased rate, which is known to encourage myopic behavior
and short term beneﬁts (from enhanced pollution) at the expense of long term
considerations. With a pollution-independent hazard rate, the occurrence
probability cannot be diminished by reduced emissions and the high discount
rate dominates the pollution policy (Gjerde et al., 1999).
Turning to the case of a variable hazard rate, we ﬁnd that the evolution
function has an additional term:
L
dd
uc(P) = Lne(P) + h(P)[   P]   h
′(P)Wuc(P):
The function Lne() vanishes at the steady-state ˆ Pne of the non-event policy and
the question whether the pollution policy is more or less conservative relative
to the risk-free situation depends on the relative magnitudes of h′( ˆ Pne)=h( ˆ Pne)
and (    ˆ Pne)=Wuc( ˆ Pne). When the hazard rate depends strongly on the
pollution state, the h′=h term dominates and Ldd
uc( ˆ Pne) < 0, implying less
pollution under uncertainty. Otherwise, the discounting eﬀect dominates,
and the uncertainty steady state of the pollution process lies above its non-
event counterpart. This type of ambiguity has been discussed by Clarke and
Reed (1994); Tsur and Zemel (1998) and Aronsson et al. (1998).
It is now easy to trace the diﬀerence between the ambiguous “doomsday”
results and the cautious policy implied by the regime shift model to the dif-
ferent speciﬁcations of the damage function (see also Polasky et al., 2011, for
a ﬁshery model with a sudden loss of total value versus a negative jump in the
carrying capacity). Under catastrophic regime shifts, the loss increases with
the parameter 2, calling for pollution reduction. Under the “doomsday” sce-
nario, the loss is equal to the steady-state value Wne which actually decreases
with the pollution stock P, encouraging more pollution. For high pollution
states which render Wne negative, occurrence is actually a desirable event be-
cause it increases the value. It follows that in spite of its great simplicity,
15the results of the “doomsday” model should be evaluated with care when one
sets to design policies under catastrophic risks. The “doomsday” model leads
to higher pollution, in the case of a constant hazard rate, and to ambiguous
results in the case of a variable hazard rate, but the regime shift model always
calls for more precaution.
7 Adaptation vs. mitigation
Our discussion so far has considered “mitigation” eﬀorts (in the form of
emission reduction) as the sole response to the pollution damage and the
regime shift risk. However, other response measures, known as “adapta-
tion”, are also possible. These include investments in means and methods to
moderate the damage associated with the shift, should it occur in spite of the
eﬀorts to mitigate the risk.
In this section we consider the simplest possible form of adaptation that
displays the adaptation-mitigation tradeoﬀs within a dynamic framework. We
assume that the hazard rate h is constant and that the policy maker holds
the option to buy, at any time prior to the shift, a technology or equipment
that will reduce the damage implied by the shift by decreasing the post-event
coeﬃcient 2. The purchase, at the given cost of R per unit change in 2, has
no eﬀect on the pre-event coeﬃcient 1. It cannot, however, be delayed until
the shift occurs, because then it would not be able to undo the shift damage
and aﬀect 2 (in other words, we consider proactive adaptation, see Smit et
al, 2000; Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010). Under this speciﬁcation, uncertainty
regarding the time of shift plays a major role in the determination of the
adaptation policy.
We consider a small reduction of the damage coeﬃcient 3 = 2   d and
evaluate ﬁrst the corresponding change in the post-event value v2(). Using the
dynamic Envelope Theorem (or alternatively, taking the derivative of (3.18)

















where P0 is the initial pollution state of the post-event problem and the con-
stants r2 < 0 and ˆ P correspond to 2. Note that the coeﬃcients of the
quadratic and linear terms in P0 are both positive, implying that the higher
is the pollution state corresponding to the shift, the larger is the gain in the
post-event value from the adaptation investment Rd.
We return now to the pre-event problem under uncertainty (2.2) and denote
by vch(P) the value obtained under constant hazard for this problem with the
original post-event damage coeﬃcient 2 and by v∗
ch(P) the corresponding
16value obtained with the reduced coeﬃcient 3 (i.e. with h(v2 + dv) replacing
hv2 in the objective integral). The argument P represents an arbitrary initial
state for these problems. Suppose that at t = 0 (when P = 0) the policy
maker commits to invest in adaptation once the pollution state will reach some
predetermined level ¯ P (unless the regime randomly shifts prior to reaching this
level, rendering adaptation useless). The remaining value at the adaptation
time  will be v∗
ch( ¯ P)   Rd. If, however, the regime shifts at some state
P < ¯ P prior to adaptation, the remaining value at the regime shift time T will
be v2(P). Taking the expectation over the distribution of the random regime








2=2 + hv2(P)]exp[ ( + h)t]dt (7.2)
+ exp[ ( + h)][v
∗
ch( ¯ P)   Rd]g
subject to (2.1), P(0) = 0, P(t) < ¯ P for t <  and P() = ¯ P, where the
adaptation time  is a free control variable that can take the value  = 1 if
the state ¯ P is never reached. Observe that  = 1 implies va = vch(0) while
 = 0 turns va into v∗
ch(0)   Rd.
Apart from the presence of the h-dependent terms, (7.2) is similar to the
certainty problem (4.1), with  replacing T as the free transition time, where
“transition” refers here to the adaptation investment rather than to the regime
shift. Indeed, the optimal process Pa() of (7.2) satisﬁes (5.5) and the general
solution is written as









If the adaptation value v∗
ch( ¯ P)   Rd were equal to vch( ¯ P), the policy maker
would be indiﬀerent about adaptation and the solution Pa() would coincide
with the policy corresponding to vch which extends over an inﬁnite horizon, so
that the integration constant p+
a would have to vanish. In fact, for adaptation
to be worthwhile at ¯ P, the relation v∗
ch( ¯ P) Rd > vch( ¯ P) must hold, because
otherwise the policy of never investing in adaptation outperforms adaptation
at the state ¯ P. It follows that the transversality condition associated with the
free choice of the adaptation time  implies p+
a > 0 (c.f. discussion in section
4). The adaptation option increases the emission rate and the corresponding
pollution stock even before this option is actually realized at .
The optimal adaptation time  is obtained in terms of the adaptation state
¯ P via the transversality condition. How is the state ¯ P determined? Suppose
that the unit adaptation cost is so large that
R > [v
∗
ch(P)   vch(P)]=d (7.4)
for all relevant pollution states (i.e. for all P  ˆ Pch). The considerations
above show that investment in adaptation is never worthwhile in this case.
17The value  = 1 can be secured by setting ¯ P > ˆ Pch and the expensive
investment will never take place. The optimal policy in this case is to follow
the process associated with vch at all times.
Suppose now that the converse of (7.4) holds at P = 0. The Envelope
Theorem result (7.1) indicates that the beneﬁts from adaptation increase with
pollution. It follows that (7.4) is violated for all P and adaptation at every
pollution state is better than the policy of never investing. We now show
that prompt adaptation, (i.e. setting ¯ P = 0) is optimal in this case, yielding
the value va = vch(0). Consider ¯ P > 0 and note that the objective of (7.2)
would increase if v∗
ch( ¯ P) Rd in the second term of the right-hand side were
replaced by vch( ¯ P). This replacement would equalize this term to the tail of
the vch problem initiated (not necessarily optimally) at time  at the state ¯ P.
The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of (7.2) gives the objective of the ﬁrst
part of vch(0). It follows that va < vch(0) for all ¯ P > 0 and therefore prompt
adaptation is optimal.
Finally, we consider the intermediate case in which (7.4) holds at P = 0
but is violated at P = ˆ Pch. Obviously, prompt adaptation is sub-optimal. By
continuity, there exists a state 0 < ˜ Pa < ˆ Pch where R = [v3
ch( ˜ Pa) v2
ch( ˜ Pa)]=d.
The considerations above imply that it is optimal to set ¯ P = ˜ Pa. Reaching
the state ˜ Pa requires some time, hence  is ﬁnite in this case. We conclude,
therefore, that intermediate adaptation costs imply delayed adaptation. Ob-
serve that the assumption of ﬁxed unit adaptation costs is not essential and
the results above also hold for pollution-dependent costs, as long as condition
(7.4) changes sign only at a unique pollution state.
Condition (7.4), which is formulated here as a comparison between the
costs and beneﬁts of the adaptation investment, reﬂects the complex dynamic
tradeoﬀs associated with the problem. First, the term v∗
ch(P) vch(P) results
from the change introduced by adaptation to the hv2 term in the objective of
(2.2). This observation manifests the role of uncertainty (in the form of the
hazard rate h) in optimizing the timing of adaptation investments. Moreover,
v∗
ch(P) vch(P) depends on the optimal mitigation policies under the diﬀerent
values of . We have shown before how the adaptation option aﬀects the mit-
igation policy. Here we show the interaction in the opposite direction, with
mitigation policies entering the condition for the cost eﬀectiveness of adapta-
tion. In a dynamic setting, the two response measures are strongly connected,
and the optimal policy requires that both are addressed simultaneously.
8 Conclusions
Regime shifts and uncertainty have become important aspects of pollution
control. This paper presents a very simple model in which the pollution
damage function may experience an instantaneous and signiﬁcant increase
18due to a random shift into a high-damage regime at a time which is subject
to uncertainty. The simple structure of the model allows to derive the full
dynamic solution of the optimal emission process and to compare the resulting
precautionary policy with the ambiguous behavior reported in the literature
for similar models. The diﬀerences are explained in terms of the corresponding
damage function in a clear and intuitive manner. In particular, we show that
in case of endogenous uncertainty (when the occurrence hazard depends on
the emission rate) the implied precaution may lead even to lower emissions
compared to the rates that are optimal in the high-damage regime. This
observation manifests the fact that policy considerations should include not
only direct pollution cost reductions but also the need to decrease the shift
probability.
Applying the model to study adaptation/mitigation tradeoﬀs, we obtain
again a full characterization of the dynamic processes and derive a condition
that determines the optimal time to initiate adaptation activities as well as
whether or not the extreme solutions (of prompt adaptation investment or
avoiding adaptation at all times) are optimal. The condition can be inter-
preted as a cost-beneﬁt criterion, comparing the long-term damage reduction
due to adaptation with its cost. Obviously, the simple formulation suggested
here cannot pretend to accuracy and important elements are left out. Never-
theless, the results presented here clearly display the tradeoﬀs at work when
one set to determine the optimal mix of mitigation and adaptation activities.
19References
Aronsson, T., Backlund K. and L¨ ofgren, K.G.: 1998, Nuclear power, external-
ities and non-standard Pigouvian taxes: a dynamical analysis under uncer-
tainty. Environmental and Resource Economics 11, 177–195.
Brozovi´ c, N. and Schlenker, W.: 2011, Optimal management of an ecosystem
with an unknown threshold. Ecological Economics 70, 627–640.
Clarke, H.R. and Reed, W.J.: 1994, Consumption/pollution tradeoﬀs in an
environment vulnerable to pollution-related catastrophic collapse. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 18, 991–1010.
Dockner, E.J. and Long, N.V.: 1993, International pollution control: Cooper-
ative versus noncooperative strategies. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 24, 13–29.
Gjerde, J., Grepperud S. and Kverndokk, S.: 1999, Optimal climate pol-
icy under the possibility of a catastrophe. Resource and Energy Economics
21, 289–317.
Gollier, Ch. and Treich, N.: 2003, Decision-making under scientiﬁc uncer-
tainty: The economics of the precautionary principle. The Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 2, 77–103.
Haurie, A. and Moresino, F.: 2006, A stochastic control model of economic
growth with environmental disaster prevention. Automatica 42, 1417–1428.
Kamien, M.I. and Schwartz N.L.: 1971, Optimal maintenance and sale age for
a machine subject to failure. Management Science, 17, 495–504.
Kane, S. and Shogren, J.F.: 2000, Linking adaptation and mitigation in cli-
mate change policy. Climatic Change 45, 75–102.
Nævdal, E.: 2006, Dynamic optimization in the presence of threshold eﬀects
when the location of the threshold is uncertain – with an application to
a possible disintegration of the Western Antarctic Ice Sheet. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 1131–1158.
Nordhaus, W.D.: 2008, A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on
Global Warming Policies Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Ploeg, F. van der and de Zeeuw, A.: 1992, International aspects of pollution
control. Environmental and Resource Economics 2, 117–139.
20Polasky, S., de Zeeuw, A. and Wagener F.: 2011, Optimal management with
potential regime shifts. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, forthcoming.
Shalizi, Z. and Lecocq, F.: 2010, To mitigate or to adapt: is that the question?
Observations on an appropriate response to the climate change challenge to
development strategies. The World Bank Research Observer 25, 295–321.
Smit, B., Burton, I., Klein, R.J.T. and Wandel J.: 2000, An anatomy of
adaptation to climate change and variability. Climatic Change 45, 223–251.
Stern, N.: 2006, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tsur, Y. and Zemel, A.: 1996, Accounting for global warming risks: resource
management under event uncertainty. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 20, 1289–1305.
Tsur, Y. and Zemel, A.: 1998, Pollution control in an uncertain environment.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 967–975.
Tsur, Y. and Zemel, A.: 2001, The inﬁnite horizon dynamic optimization prob-
lem revisited: A simple method to determine equilibrium states. European
Journal of Operational Research 131, 482–490.
Tsur, Y. and Zemel, A.: 2004, Endangered aquifers: Groundwater man-
agement under threats of catastrophic events. Water Resources Research
40, W06S20.
Tsur, Y. and Zemel, A.: 2009, Endogenous discounting and climate policy.
Environmental and Resource Economics 44, 507–520.
Weitzman, M.L.: 2009, On modeling and interpreting the economics of catas-
trophic climate change. The Review of Economics and Statistics 91, 1–19.
21